My Enemy's Enemy Might Still Be My Enemy.
No matter what General Petraeus & Co. actually say when they testify about progress in Iraq on Monday, it's already obvious what the spin from the Bush camp will be. While they may admit -- in an offhand sort of way -- that the progress we've seen in Iraq hasn't reached desired levels, they will almost certainly shine their rhetorical spotlight on the fact that in the once-dangerous Al-Anbar province of Iraq, Sunnis who were previously fighting against American forces with the help of Al-Qaeda are now fighting against Al-Qaeda with the help of American forces. Of course, this definitely sounds like a good thing -- what could be bad about some of our worst enemies becoming our friends and allies? Isn't that a valid sign of progress? Well, yes... and no. If these Sunni ex-insurgents have truly experienced a miraculous change of heart overnight, the news is fantastic. Unfortunately, the reality of the situation is probably a little less rosy.
This is because our new-found Sunni allies still hate our guts; they just happen to hate Al-Qaeda's guts a little bit more. They're our co-belligerents in the fight against Al-Qaeda, not friends -- and there happens to be a difference. The main difference being that once Al-Qaeda is driven from Al-Anbar province, there's a fair chance that these foul-weather friends could turn on us hard and fast.
Now, I'm not omnipotent or anything, so I may be wrong about this. But looking at the history of the situation, I don't think it's an altogether unreasonable assessment:
(1) For years, the Sunni tribes in Al-Anbar province wanted us dead. Coincidentally, Al-Qaeda also wanted us dead. Because of this convergence of interests, Al-Qaeda and the Sunnis developed a relationship of co-belligerency against the American forces.
(2) But then, Al-Qaeda crossed the line, attempting to control the Sunnis using brutal tactics of terror and intimidation. Now the Sunnis wanted to get rid of Al-Qaeda, but they couldn't do it alone. Coincidentally, the American forces also wanted to get rid of Al-Qaeda, but they couldn't do it without local support. This second convergence of interests allowed us to develop our current relationship of co-belligerency with the Sunnis.
So what happens when Al-Qaeda is removed from the scene? The most logical step for the Sunni's of Al-Anbar would be a return to the fight against the American occupation. The current Sunni-American alliance is built on a common goal, not deep seated loyalty or a mutual love of democracy. Once that goal is achieved, it would be naive to assume that this alliance built on self-interest will hold. Worse still, Sunnis who were taking pot-shots at us only months ago are now receiving weapons, funds, and training from the U.S military. If the Sunnis decide to bite the hand that feeds them, we could find ourselves faced with a well-fed enemy indeed.
In a time when hope for Iraq seems scarce, it's only natural that the administration tries to cling to every scrap of good news it can find. But placing an unrealistic amount of trust in an alliance that seems flaky at best may not be the greatest idea in the world. What seems like an investment in the future stability of Iraq could easily turn into a dangerous gamble -- and the American people may not be able to tolerate another major blunder in an already unpopular war.
1 comment:
It's certainly possible that they will turn on us after Al Qaeda and the other foreign born insurgents get destroyed. However, two brief points on this: First, even if that does happen, I think we would still be better off than before, at least in pure military terms, because we would have eliminated a major part of the insurgency, as well as created what will likely be a long term rift between Al Qaeda and Iraqi Sunnis - even if the Sunnis attack us as soon as Al Qaeda is done, they won't soon forget that they teamed up against Al Qaeda - and keeping various groups that hate us at each others throats is obviously to our advantage.
Secondly, there is another effect that this is having - it's making the Shias sit up and take notice. They know that the Sunnis are organizing, and that the Shias will either have to cooperate with the Sunnis, or destroy them. The second is certainly possible, and would be very bad and bloody - however I think the first is more likely, and I think this is shown by Al Sadr's panic in calling for a six month ceasefire with his Mahdi "army". He's being smart in biding his time - if the Sunnis fail to destroy Al Qaeda, Sadr can jump back in when the American troops start leaving.
But if they succeed, and their part of the country becomes as peaceable as the Kurdish North, say, then the Shias will most likely deal with the Sunnis as long as they can believe the Sunnis won't start any trouble - if they do that, Sadr is screwed unless he can manage to gain power in the coalition that would form.
Anything, this is getting pretty long, but suffice to say I mostly agree with what you're saying, I'm just not sure you're completely taking into account all the factors. (Which isn't hard, considering how complex everything is over there) Expect a blog post of my own on the subject in a day or two) Very interesting, as always.
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